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Abstract
The 20079 nancial crisis began with increased uncertainty over funding
conditions in money markets. We show that funding uncertainty can explain
diverse elements of commercial banksbehaviour during the crisis, including:
(i) reductions in lending volumes, balance sheets, and protability; (ii) more
intense competition for retail deposits (including deposits turning into a loss
leader); (iii) stronger lending cuts by more highly extended banks with a
smaller deposit base; (iv) weaker pass-through from changes in the central
banks policy rate to market interest rates; and (v) a binding zero lower
boundas well as a rationale for unconventional monetary policy.
Keywords: Bank lending, nancial crises, interbank market, interest rate
pass-through, liquidity channel, loan-to-deposit ratio, loss leader, monetary
policy, zero lower bound.
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1 Introduction
The nancial crisis began in August 2007 with an extended period of turmoil in
money markets. Interbank rates such as Libor disconnected from central banks
policy rates and remained unusually high and volatile for an extended period (Tay-
lor and Williams, 2009). Volumes of interbank lending, too, fell sharply and became
more volatile (Afonso et al., 2010; Kuo et al., 2013). Both e¤ects were most pro-
nounced for unsecured (i.e., uncollateralized) term loans between banks with ma-
turities of 3 months or more. Similar e¤ects were felt in wider wholesale funding
markets, such as the markets for repos and commercial paper (Adrian and Shin,
2010). Commonly cited reasons for the turmoil are counterparty risk and an in-
creased demand for liquidity (Acharya and Skeie, 2011).
Regarding the behaviour of commercial banks during the crisis, there is signif-
icant evidence that customer lending in many countries declined (Campbell et al.,
2011; Santos, 2011), and that banks became less protable (Bank of England, 2008;
ECB, 2013). Two important related e¤ects have recently been documented. First,
banks with better access to deposits have tended to cut lending by less (Cornett et
al., 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Iyer et al., 2013). Second, the ECB (2013)
data summarized in Figure 1 suggests that more extended banking systems, as mea-
sured by high loan-to-deposit ratios, experienced stronger drops in bank lending.
Central banks responded to the turmoil by aggressively cutting policy rates,
moving close to the zero lower boundin many countries. Commentators expressed
surprise at the apparently small impact that these rate cuts had on market interest
rates. Moreover, central banks used unconventional tools such as asset purchases
and quantitative easing in an e¤ort to normalize money market conditions.
This paper develops a theory of the link between increased money market un-
certainty, commercial bank behaviour, and monetary policy which can explain and
rationalize these empirical observations. We consider a partial-equilibrium model of
a payo¤-maximizing commercial bank. The bank extends retail loans and funds it-
self with retail deposits, equity capital, and via the money market.1 The key feature
is uncertainty over money market funding conditions.
We highlight two examples within our general setup. In the rst, a risk-neutral
bank faces uncertain aggregate liquidity in money markets where lenders are con-
cerned about counterparty risk. This creates convex wholesale borrowing costs: Its
(expected) wholesale funding rate increases in the amount borrowed, and also in-
creases in the degree of liquidity uncertainty. In the second, the bank has nite
tolerance for risk, (e.g., because of delegation to risk-averse managers), and faces
1Our main interest is in banks that are net borrowers in the wholesale market; this corresponds
to loan-to-deposit ratios at least modestly above 100%. Figure 1 shows that this condition applied
to most European banking systems.
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Figure 1: Loan-to-deposit ratios and loan growth in European banking systems.
Source: ECB (2013)
stochastic money market rates. It can borrow any amount at a constant rate, but
raising its interbank market exposure increases its risk-adjusted funding rate.
In line with the empirical ndings, we show that a bank responds to higher
funding uncertainty by lending less together with a substitution e¤ect by which it
increases its use of deposit nance and raises additional equity capital from investors.
Equilibrium market interest rates for loans and deposits both increase. Higher un-
certainty also reduces bank protability, measured, e.g., by return on equity. We
show that these rst-ordercomparative statics are robust to a wide range of model
specications.2
Substitution into deposit nance has striking welfare implications. In our second
example, if the banks risk tolerance is low, its deposit business can become a loss
leader, with the deposit rate exceeding its own wholesale funding cost. This implies
that depositor welfare exceeds the level associated with a competitive market.3
2Our benchmark model focuses on the stylized case where the bank acts as a monopolist, in
retail markets (perhaps due to customer lock-in or switching costs), and only faces uncertainty
in money markets. We show that our results are robust to (i) di¤erent competitive conditions,
including oligopoly and price-taking; (ii) multiple sources of risk; and (iii) xed level of bank equity,
e.g. due to binding capital requirements. (See the Appendix, Extensions AC.)
3This risk-based version of loss leaders di¤ers markedly from other mechanisms identied in
the literature. These generally rely on product complementarities (e.g., razor and razor blades) or
on particular features of the strategic interaction between rms (e.g., related to entry deterrence).
By contrast, in our model, loss leaders can occur even in a single-bank setting where loans and
deposits are entirely independent in terms of demand and supply conditions.
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Our model is also consistent with the second-ordere¤ects observed in the data.
A bank with less favourable access to deposit nance chooses to be more extended
ex ante (with a higher loan-to-deposit ratio) and cuts lending by more when funding
uncertainty rises.4 A key condition for this result is that wholesale funding costs are
supermodular in funding uncertainty and the amount borrowed.5 This means that
the cost of raising money market funds rises with uncertainty, and that this e¤ect
is more pronounced the greater a banks exposure.
Turning to monetary policy, we show that heightened funding uncertainty typ-
ically dampens the rate of pass-through from policy to retail interest rates. This
may help explain the reduced e¤ectiveness of monetary policy observed during the
crisis. The key condition, once again, is that a banks money market funding costs
are supermodular in uncertainty and the amount borrowed. In extreme cases where
funding uncertainty becomes large, pass-through tends to zero and market interest
rates are completely frozen.
Building on this, we consider the optimal response of an ination-targeting cen-
tral bank to higher funding uncertainty. We show that increased uncertainty may
lead to a binding zero lower bound on policy rates. In our rst example with
uncertain market liquidity, this can justify unconventional policies such as quantita-
tive easing and asset purchases. These policies dampen the adverse e¤ect of funding
uncertainty, using liquidity as a substitutefor calmer market conditions to stim-
ulate demand. Moreover, we show that the central bank can be more e¤ective if
there is a liquidity channel, i.e., a rate cut increases aggregate liquidity in money
markets, for instance, because it is conducted through repo lending or open market
operations.
The fact that heightened funding uncertainty can account for such diverse aspects
of observed bank behaviour distinguishes this mechanism from others. For example,
in a standard banking model, a decrease in the demand for loans typically also
leads to a decline in bank lending and bank protability. However, it is less clear
how or why reduced loan demand simultaneously raises deposit rates and dampens
interest rate pass-through in both loan and deposit markets. Funding uncertainty, by
contrast, presents a mechanism that connects all these elements of bank behaviour.
One way of understanding the economic forces at work is in terms of synergies
between the loan and deposit sides of a banks operations. An increase, say, in
a banks deposit bases reduces the funding (risk) exposure of further loan commit-
ments, which in turn makes lending themselves more attractive. As uncertainty over
4Our results are also consistent with empirical evidence that low-capital banks tend to charge
higher interest rates on loans than well-capitalized banks (Hubbard et al., 2002).
5The basic denition is that a function g is supermodular if g(inf(x; y))+ g(sup(x; y))  g(x)+
g(y) for all x, y. We here work with a di¤erentiable case, for which (strict) supermodularity boils
down to a positive cross-partial derivative, i.e., gxy > 0.
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funding conditions increases, these uncertainty-induced synergies become stronger,
and the bank becomes more concerned with asset-liability management. Put this
way, our paper contributes to the literature on loan-deposit synergies (Gatev et al.,
2009; Kashyap et al., 2002) that focuses on interactions between the two sides of a
banks balance sheet.
Section 2 sets up the baseline model and explains its key properties; it also
presents our two examples that t into the general framework. Section 3 analyzes
the impact of funding uncertainty on equilibrium outcomes in credit markets, a
banks balance sheet and its protability and relates our ndings to the empirical
evidence. Section 4 examines monetary policy including interest rate pass-through,
the problem of the zero lower bound, and the potential role of unconventional
policy measures. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks and some directions for future
research. (The Appendix contains details of our robustness analysis.)
2 The baseline model
We study decision-making of a bank that extends retail loans L, and funds itself
with customer deposits D, equity capital K and unsecured money market borrowing
M . The banks balance sheet constraint therefore is L = D +K +M .
We focus on the case where the bank is a net borrower in money markets (M > 0)
unless stated otherwise. Dening the banks loan-to-deposit ratio `  L=D, note
that M > 0 , ` > (1 +K=D)  b`, where b` is typically only modestly above
100% since most commercial bankscustomer deposits are many times larger than
equity capital. As discussed in the introduction, our focus on interbank borrowers
is motivated by the empirical fact that many countriesbanking sectors were highly
extended going into the nancial crisis, e.g., the UK and much of the Eurozone.
We assume that the bank has a degree of market power in its loan and deposit
markets. One could think of this as a model of banks with di¤erentiated products,
certain regulatory restrictions, or a captiveconsumer base due to informational
lock-in or switching costs, all of which would generate market power. As shown later
on, our results are robust to di¤erent forms of competition between banks.6
The inverse demand curve for loans is given by rL = fL (L), where rL is the
market interest rate on loans, and demand is downward-sloping with fLL () < 0.7
Similarly, the inverse supply curves for deposits and capital are given by rD = fD (D)
6See Sharpe (1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) for theoretical and empirical support for
informational lock-in as a source of banksmarket power, and Kim et al. (2003) for empirical
evidence of switching costs in banking. Allen and Gale (2000), Boyd and de Nicoló (2005), Hannan
and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Neven and Röller (1999), Stein (1998), and Wong
(1997) analyze related models of loan and/or deposit markets although none of these consider the
impact of funding uncertainty in the money market.
7Throughout the paper, subscripts on functions are used to denote (partial) derivatives.
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and rK = fK (K), respectively, where rD is the market interest rate on deposits and
rK is the expected return on equity. Higher deposit rates attract more depositors
and higher returns attract more equity investors, so fDD () > 0 and fKK () > 0.8
For clarity of exposition, we assume there are no operational economies of scope
between the banks loan and deposit sides; without much further loss of generality,
the banks operating costs are set to zero.
The key feature of our model is that the bank faces uncertainty over funding
conditions in the money market. In particular, the cost of money market funds
depends on the realization of a random variable ". The distribution of " is F" (";),
where E ["] = 0 and E ["2] = . The parameter  is central to our analysis as it
captures the degree of funding uncertainty.
The banks cost of funding is given by C (M;R; "), where R is the policy rate
controlled by the central bank. The banks problem is to:
max
(L;D;K;M)2R4+
U = fL(L)L  fD(D)D   fK(K)K   E[C(M;R; ")]
subject to L = D +K +M . (1)
Dene marginal revenues and cost functions MRL (L)  @
@L

fL(L)L

, MCD (D) 
@
@D

fD(D)D

, MCK (K)  @
@K

fK(K)K

as well as the banks expected marginal
funding cost in the money market (M;R; )  @
@M
E[C(M;R; ")]. The rst-order
conditions for an interior solution are
UL = MR
L (L)  (M; R; ) = 0
UD =  MCD (D) + (M; R; ) = 0
UK =  MCK (K) + (M; R; ) = 0, (2)
where the starred variables L; D; K;M > 0 are optimal choices.9 ;10 We study
the well-behaved case where these conditions are su¢ cient for a maximum. For this
8Following Allen and Gale (2000) and Boyd and de Nicoló (2005), were here assume implicitly
that deposits are fully insured, so the supply of funds does not depend on risk. The model
could easily be extended to incorporate a at-rate insurance premium per unit of deposits without
a¤ecting any of the results presented.
9A su¢ cient condition for the existence of an interior solution is MRL (0) >  (0; R; ) and
MCD (0) = MCK (0) <  (0; R; ). By assuming interior solutions, we are imposing that the
Modigliani-Miller conditions are violated so there is a meaningful trade-o¤ between bank capital
and debt. A microfoundation for this would include nancing frictions in capital and debt markets.
Capital may be costly due to asymmetric information as in Myers and Majluf (1984) or because it
lacks the disciplining e¤ect of debt as in Calomiris and Kahn (1991). Example 1 gives an explicit
foundation of frictions in money market debt funding.
10The baseline model assumes that funding uncertainty  does not directly a¤ect the cost of
capital MCK (K), although we shall see that it indirectly raises it (since K > 0 and MC
K
K > 0).
Our robustness analysis allows for a direct e¤ect, that is, MCK > 0 (see the Appendix, Extension
B), so factors that raise wholesale funding uncertainty here also raise the cost of equity.
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purpose, we assume that MRLL < 0, MC
D
D > 0, MC
K
K > 0 and M  0 everywhere,
where the subscripts again denote partial derivatives.11
We now present two examples of how the cost of money market funds C(M;R; "),
and the measure of funding uncertainty , can be interpreted. We argue that un-
certainty likely raises the expected marginal cost of wholesale funds,  > 0.
Example 1: Counterparty risk and aggregate liquidity shocks
This example is based on two basic frictions: (i) potential lenders in money markets
are concerned about default, and there is asymmetric information between interbank
lenders and borrowers; (ii) there is uncertain aggregate liquidity.
Our setup captures some of the main intuitions of the theoretical literature on
interbank market turmoil. Asymmetric information is emphasized by Freixas and
Holthausen (2005), Freixas and Jorge (2008) and Heider et al. (2009). Uncertain
aggregate liquidity can arise due to liquidity hoarding by banks as in Acharya and
Skeie (2011), or could be interpreted as a reduced-form model of limited funding
liquidityin secured debt markets as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008).
This example also ts the recent empirical literature on the causes of money
market turmoil. While early contributions such as Taylor and Williams (2009)
emphasized counterparty risk, liquidity considerations are identied as a key factor
by Acharya and Merrouche (2012), Michaud and Upper (2008) and Schwarz (2009).
External lenders in the money market believe that there is a risk of facing a toxic
bank, which defaults with probability 1. There is a unit measure of external lenders
indexed by i 2 [0; 1], each of whom is risk-neutral with an opportunity cost equal to
the risk-free rate R. Each lender has X dollars to lend out, where X is a measure of
aggregate liquidity satisfying X = + ", with  > 0 a constant measuring expected
aggregate liquidity and " a random variable. There are two aggregate states for
liquidity, which are equally likely: In the high state, " = , and in the low state,
" =  , where 0 <  < . The parameter  thus captures uncertainty about
aggregate liquidity.12
There are di¤erences of opinion among lenders: Lender i believes that the bank is
toxic with probability i. To borrow a dollar from lender i, the bank has to promise
11An implicit assumption is that the interest rates on loans and deposits do not depend on ". If
complete contracts contingent on money market conditions were feasible, the nature of the optimal
contract would be determined by the risk aversion of banks and their customers. However, if
banks are less risk-averse than retail customers, the optimal contract would probably be close to
the xed-rate case analysed here. The assumption of incomplete contracts seems sensible as it is
unlikely that retail customers have enough information about money markets to verify ". It also
matches the empirical fact that variable-rate loans and deposits tend to be contingent on central
bank policy rates rather than interbank rates such as Libor.
12The binary state structure is introduced purely for clarity of exposition. A more general
model would yield the same results as long as an increase in  signied a mean-preserving spread
of aggregate liquidity in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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repayment of X=(1   i) dollars to compensate for the perceived risk of facing a
toxic bank. To derive the cost of funds for borrowers, consider the cheapest way of
borrowing M > 0 dollars. This is to go to the M=X most optimistic lenders, i.e.
i 2 [0;M=X], and to borrow X from each. The cost function is thus given by
C(M;R; ") 
Z M=X
0

RX
1  i

di (3)
and, by Leibniz rule, the marginal cost is @C(M;R; ")=@M = R=(1 M=X). Assume
that the net interest rate is close to zero, and that individual bank borrowing is small
relative to aggregate liquidity, i.e., R ' 1 andM=X ' 0. By a Taylor expansion, the
marginal cost is then approximately R +M=X. Banks pay a markup proportional
to the amount borrowed and inversely proportional to aggregate liquidity. So the
(approximate) expected marginal cost is:
(M;R; ) = R +M  E" [1=X]
= R +
1
2

1
+ 
+
1
  

M = R +

(1=)  1
[1  (=)2]

M .
Marginal cost equals the policy rate R plus a spread driven by liquidity and
counterparty risk. The spread is inuenced by two factors. The rst factor 1=
measures the average tightness of the money market. When expected aggregate
liquidity is low, the bank is forced to borrow from more pessimistic lenders, which
drives up the cost of funds. The second factor is an increasing function of =, which
is the coe¢ cient of variation of aggregate liquidity. It is easy to see that funding
uncertainty here raises marginal cost,  > 0. This is because the marginal funding
cost R +M=X is convex in aggregate liquidity, so a mean-preserving spread of the
liquidity distribution increases its expectation.
Intuitively, when uncertainty increases, the additional costs given in a low liq-
uidity state more than o¤set the savings in a high liquidity state. When liquidity is
very low, the bank has to borrow from very pessimistic lenders whose belief that it
is toxic is close to 1 and for which the required interest rate becomes large.
Note that this example captures both quantity and price uncertainty in money
markets, since aggregate liquidity shocks shift the entire supply curve of bank fund-
ing. This is consistent with evidence in Afonso et al. (2011) who show quantity
rationing and the problem of rolling over interbank debt on a day-to-day basis.
Example 2: Limited risk tolerance
Our second example is based on the premise that banks have some incentive to
reduce the riskiness of their prots. In an inuential paper, Froot and Stein (1998)
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argue that banks should be concerned with risk management as they, in practice,
cannot frictionlessly hedge all the risks they face. There are many other reasons
why banks may act as if they were risk-averse, including costs of nancial distress,
non-linear tax systems, and delegation of control to risk-averse managers; see also
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990).13
Suppose that the interest rate in money markets is given by the policy rate plus
a random spread, i.e., R+ ". The banks prots, contingent on the realization of ",
are thus  = fL(L)L fD(D)D fK(K)K  (R + ")M . For simplicity, we assume
mean-variance preferences with a coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion 1=, so we can
interpret  2 (0;1) as the banks level of risk tolerance. Hence, the banks objective
function is
U = E []  (1=2)V ar [] , (4)
where the risk-adjusted cost of wholesale funds is given by RM + (1=2)V ar [] =
fR + (1=2)2MgM . So the expected marginal cost of money market funding is:
 (M;R; ) = R + (1=)2M . (5)
Again, marginal cost equals the policy rate plus a spread which increases in funding
uncertainty, so that  > 0 whenever the bank is a (net) interbank borrower with
M > 0. The sensitivity of marginal funding costs to uncertainty here is driven by
the banks desire to avoid exposure to risky funding instruments.14
While we emphasize the role of higher funding uncertainty, our results thus also
apply to decreases in the banks risk tolerance , holding funding uncertainty 
xed or to combinations of changes in these two parameters (since risk aversion
and funding uncertainty enter multiplicatively into  (M;R; )). We can also think
of the bank as initially being risk-neutral (or even slightly risk-loving) but then
becoming risk-averse, e.g., in the context of a nancial crisis.15
13On the empirical side, Angelini (2000) shows how intra-day behaviour in the Italian interbank
market is consistent with risk aversion; Hughes and Mester (1998), Nishiyama (2007) and Ratti
(1980) nd evidence for risk-averse behaviour by US commercial banks (or their managers).
14This mean-variance setup would (i) generally arise if funding uncertainty is normally dis-
tributed, and (ii) holds approximately for any risk-averse utility function if funding uncertainy
is small. To see why, note that the rst-order conditions U 0 ()j = 0 =) E [j ] +
cov (U 0 () ;j) =E [U 0 ()] = 0 for j = fL;D;Kg, where the latter term is marginal risk. Now,
if (i) if  and j are normally distributed (by Steins lemma, see Huang and Litzenberger, 1988)
or (ii)  is small (by Taylors theorem), then cov (U 0 () ;i) =U 0 () =  (1=)  cov (;j). It is
easy to check that the rst-order conditions are identical to those from the mean-variance analysis,
with a risk-adjusted marginal funding cost of  (M;R; ) = R+ (1=)2M .
15Throughout, we have assumed that banks never actually default, so limited liability is not a
concern. Adding default and limited liability to the model would introduce complications beyond
our scope. If the probability of default were close to one, the results on funding choices below might
be o¤set by risk-seeking when there is limited liability (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Risk-seeking
would also create a case for regulation in the presence of deposit insurance (Merton, 1977) or too
9
The common thread between Examples 1 and 2 is that the banks (approximate)
marginal funding cost satises (R;M; ) = R + h()M , where M = h() > 0 as
well as  = hM > 0 (both for any  > 0).
16,17
3 The impact of increased funding uncertainty
We begin our main analysis by exploring the implications of increased funding un-
certainty in money markets for a banks loan and deposit decisions, as well as its
optimal choice of equity capital. This also yields predictions regarding its impact
on banksinterbank market exposure and equilibrium market interest rates.
3.1 Credit markets and balance sheets
Recall that the banks equilibrium choices of loans L, deposits D, and capital
K are determined by the system of three equilibrium conditions in (2). Let the
associated interest rates on loans rL = f
L(L) and deposits rD = f
D(D).
Proposition 1 With  > 0, an increase in funding uncertainty induces a bank to:
(i) extend fewer loans L and increase interest rates on loans rL
(ii) take more deposits D and increase interest rates on deposits rD
(iii) increase its level of equity capital K
(iv) reduce its interbank market borrowing M
(v) decrease its loan-to-deposit ratio `
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions (2) yields the system0B@ ULL ULD ULKUDL UDD UDK
UKL UKD UKK
1CA
0B@ L


D
K
1CA =  
0B@ ULUD
UK
1CA . (6)
big to failpolicies. In abstracting from limited liability, we e¤ectively assume that default is not
imminent, so prot concerns dominate the risk-seeking e¤ect.
16The examples di¤er in two more detailed respects. First, without uncertainty, marginal cost
in Example 1 is  (R;M; 0) > R, whereas it is  (R;M; 0) = R in Example 2 since zero funding
uncertainty makes the bank behave as if it were risk-neutral and able to borrow in the money
market at a constant rate. Second, the banks payo¤ U equals its expected prots in Example
1, while limited risk tolerance implies a wedge between payo¤s and prots in Example 2. This
distinction is important only for interpreting Proposition 2 on protability and return on equity.
17We focus on cases where the bank is a net interbank market borrower, M > 0. Most of
for formal results do not directly rely on this property; rather the proofs use the condition that
 > 0. In Example 1, these two conditions are two sides of the same coin. Some of our results
also go through for banks with M < 0 in the context of Example 2. This includes reduced bank
protability (Proposition 2) and weaker interest rate pass-through (Proposition 8). See the earlier
working paper, Ritz (2012).
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The left-hand matrix is the Hessian of the objective function U , which we call H.
Its determinant is
jHj =MRLLMCDDMCKK

1 + M

1
MCKK
+
1
[ MRLL]
+
1
MCDD

< 0. (7)
Using Cramers rule to solve the system, we obtain
L = jHj 1 MCDDMCKK < 0 (8)
D = jHj 1 MRLLMCKK > 0
K = jHj 1 MRLLMCDD > 0
since MRLL < 0, MC
D
D > 0, MC
K
K > 0, and  > 0 by assumption, thus proving
parts (i) and (iii). Part (ii) now follows as fLL (L) < 0 and f
D
D (D) > 0, part (iv) since
M = L  D  K and part (v) since ` = L=D.
These results are driven by the property that the banks expected marginal cost
of funding in the interbank market rises with the degree of funding uncertainty,
 > 0 which is satised by both Examples 1 and 2.
The intuition is straightforward: A higher (risk-adjusted) wholesale funding cost
induces the bank to substitute away to other sources of nancing. In particular,
deposit funds become relatively more attractive, with deposit rates and volumes
rising; moreover, the bank raises additional equity capital. Conversely, the rise in
 raises the opportunity cost of extending loans, with loan rates rising and lending
volumes falling as a result. All together, the bank reduces its money market exposure
and cuts its loan-to-deposit ratio.
This set of predictions is consistent with emerging base of stylized facts on bank
behaviour during the nancial crisis. It was plain that banks cut back on loans,
thereby making it more di¢ cult and costly for retail and corporate customers to
borrow. For example, it was noted that banks have cut overdraft facilities and un-
used credit lines, withdrawn from lending syndicates and abruptly called in loans.
When they do lend, they are charging higher arrangement fees and interest at mar-
gins over their cost of funding that are considerably higher than they were (The
Economist, 24 January 2009). Campbell et al. (2011) present evidence from a sur-
vey of US CFOs which strongly suggests that corporate borrowers became worse o¤,
and Santos (2011) nds that borrowersinterest rate spreads increased.18
18Of course, there are competing explanations for an observed reduction in bank lending, no-
tably a decrease in the demand for loans. Puri et al. (2011) distinguish between the demand
and supply e¤ects of the US-led mortgage crisis on lending by German savings banks, where the
particular ownership structure meant that some banks were directly a¤ected whilst others were
not. They show that loan demand decreased for both types of banks, but also the supply-side
result that a¤ected banks reduced lending signicantly more strongly, consistent with our result
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There is also signicant evidence that banks tried to reduce their exposure to the
wholesale market from when the nancial crisis began in the second half of 2007.19
ECB (2012, p. 15) observes that the nancial crisis broke a broad global funding
trend characterized by a strong reliance in wholesale funding sources in favour of
more stable retail sources of funding. This implies that bank funding strategies
needed to be adjusted quickly in order to expand the customer deposit base and
reduce the share of wholesale funding.The di¤erence between money market rates
and deposit rates in the Eurozone adjusted sharply from being strongly positive
(around 150300 basis points over the 20032008) to only slightly positive from
late 2008 until 2011 (ECB, 2012). In the UK, many banks sought to raise more
funds from retail customers by raising interest rates on existing deposit accounts
and introducing various new savings products.20
Our results can also rationalize trends in banks loan-to-deposit ratios. After
years of rising loan-to-deposit ratios, the Eurozone unweighted average was 138% in
the autumn of 2008, but gradually declined over the following years. Moreover, there
was a strong decline near the top of the distribution; while some banks had peak
loan-to-deposit ratios of around 250%, the maximum ratio had declined to around
175% by 2011 (ECB, 2012). Indeed, several UK banks, including Royal Bank of
Scotland, set themselves the aim of achieving a loan-to-deposit ratio of no more
than 100% over the next ve years(Financial Times, 19 June 2009).
Finally, in response to the turmoil, many banks also sought to raise additional eq-
uity capital from investors, sometimes apparently under considerable pressure from
regulators. Proposition 1 highlights that a payo¤-maximizing bank facing increased
funding uncertainty would, in fact, nd it privately optimal to raise more capital
even in the absence of regulatory intervention, or any crisis-induced reductions in
available equity due to trading losses or writedowns (Brunnermeier, 2009).
3.2 Bank protability and return on equity
We now turn to the impact of funding uncertainty on bank protability.
Proposition 2 With  > 0, an increase in funding uncertainty decreases a banks
equilibrium expected payo¤.
from Proposition 1.
19The situation at the time was summarized by a bank manager at Alliance & Leicester: Lenders
are having to examine di¤erent funding routes. The increasing rates have no doubt been driven by
the turmoil in the wholesale markets(Financial Times, 1 December 2007). Alliance & Leicester
is a medium-sized British bank (and former building society) that was subsequently taken over by
Banco Santander of Spain (in October 2008).
20Our results are also consistent with evidence that banksinterbank liabilities as a proportion of
total assets fell substantially from the 3rd quarter of 2008 onwards, which corresponds to a decline
in M=L in our model (since L falls by more than M falls).
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Proof. By the envelope theorem, @
@
U(L; D; K) =   @
@
E[C(M; R; ")] since
L, D, and K are all chosen optimally. Recalling the denition (M;R; ) 
@
@M
E[C(M;R; ")], we can also write E[C(M; R; ")] =
RM
0
(M 0; R; )dM 0. It
follows that @
@
E[C(M; R; ")] =
RM
0
(M
0; R; )dM 0 > 0 given the assumption
 > 0, thus proving the claim that
@
@
U(L; D; K) < 0.
Often a banks expected payo¤ is synonymous with its expected prots, including
in our Example 1. In such cases, Proposition 2 implies that funding uncertainty
reduces a banks average return on equity (ROE), dened as U(L; D; K)=K (by
combining Proposition 2 with our earlier result from Proposition 1(iii) thatK > 0).
In cases without risk-neutrality, as in Example 2, the result tells us that funding
uncertainty reduces the banks expected utility or that of its managers. However,
it is not di¢ cult to show that the same conclusion also applies for such a banks
expected protability.21 Intuitively, higher funding uncertainty tightens the utility
constrainton the banks expected prots, thus distorting its optimal loan, deposit
and equity choices further away from the (prot-maximizing) risk-neutral case.
Proposition 2 thus suggests that increased uncertainty about funding conditions
per se leads to a reduction in bank protability. This is consistent with evidence
for a sharp drop in UK banksROEs in the second half of 2007 when funding un-
certainty initially increased (Bank of England, 2008, p. 38), and with low bank
protability levels in the Eurozone since 2008 (ECB, 2013, p. 20). It is also consis-
tent, all else equal, with decreases in banksstock prices and market capitalizations.
More generally, it is possible that a bank could become loss-making overall in the
presence of signicant xed costs that need to be covered for it to be operational.
3.3 Robustness of Propositions 1 and 2
Propositions 1 and 2 are robust to many changes in the models specication. The
Appendix contains formal proofs and more detailed discussion of our robustness
analysis. In summary, we consider three modications to the baseline model:
First, we analyze situations where the banks level of equity capital is xed,
perhaps due to a binding regulatory capital requirement or because the bank is
unable to raise additional equity from investors in the short run. This can be
thought of as the limiting case of the baseline model where the marginal cost of
21To see why, observe that funding uncertainty a¤ects a risk-averse banks equilibrium expected
prots E [] according to E [] = E[L]L

 + E[D]D

 + E[K ]K

. Now recall the banks
rst-order conditions which can be written as UL = E[L]   (1=)2M = 0, UD = E[D] +
(1=)2M = 0, and UK = E[K ]+(1=)2M = 0, respectively. Since the bank is a net wholesale
borrower, M > 0, the rst-order conditions imply E [L] > 0, E [D] < 0, and E [K ] < 0. By
Proposition 1, we already know that L < 0, D

 > 0, and K

 > 0. Putting these elements together
shows that the banks prots E [] < 0 decline (as does its ROE).
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capital is extremely convex, MCKK ! 1, such that the banks choice of capital is
e¤ectively inexible. We show that Propositions 1 and 2 apply exactly as above in
such cases.22
Second, we consider situations where the bank faces additional risks, such as
credit risks in its loan portfolio. As long as these additional risks are not correlated
with funding uncertainty, our previous results from Propositions 1 and 2 certainly
hold exactly as above. Proposition 1 also goes through under reasonable conditions
on the additional (correlated) sources of uncertainty in the loans market and that
for equity capital. Finally, we show that higher funding uncertainty very generally
reduces the banks expected payo¤, as in Proposition 2.
Third, we analyze di¤erent forms of competition between banks in loan and
deposit markets, including with di¤erentiated products. We show that the results
from Proposition 1 apply very generally with di¤erent market structures, ranging
from concentrated oligopolies to perfectly competitive markets in banks act as a
price-takers over loans and deposits. Proposition 2 continues to hold under fairly
general conditions although the induced cutbacks in lending by other banks tend
to soften the adverse prot impact of funding uncertainty.
3.4 Deposit access as competitive advantage
One of our key ndings so far is the rst-order comparative static that banks
respond to higher funding uncertainty by cutting back their lending volumes. Here
we examine a second-ordercomparative static: How does this reduction in lending
vary with a banks access to customer deposits?
We begin by showing that, all else equal, a bank with less favourable deposit
access holds more equity capital (to compensate), relies more heavily on nancing
via interbank markets, and chooses to become more extended in terms of its loan-
to-deposit ratio. Under reasonable conditions, such a bank also cuts lending more
strongly than an otherwise identical bank that has a stronger deposit base.
Formally, suppose there exists a parameter ' which shifts the banks cost of
attracting deposits upwards, in that the cost of deposits fD(D;')D with marginal
costMCD(D;') satisfyingMCD' > 0 everywhere. We can thus address how deposit
access a¤ects a banks equilibrium choices:
Proposition 3 With M > 0, a bank with less favourable deposit access will:
(i) extend fewer loans L and increase interest rates on loans rL
(ii) take less deposits D and decrease interest rates on deposits rD
22Further results from this specialized model are that banks which su¤er larger reductions in
equity capital, say, due to trading losses increase interest rates on loans by more, and, conversely,
an explanation for how recapitalizations (by shareholders or government) can counteract upward
pressure on interest rates due to funding uncertainty. See Ritz (2012) for further details.
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(iii) choose a higher level of equity capital K
(iv) choose a higher level of interbank market borrowing M
(v) choose a higher loan-to-deposit ratio `
Proof. Performing comparative statics using the same techniques as above, we nd
L' = jHj 1 MMCD'MCKK < 0
D' = jHj 1MCD'
 MRLLMCKK + M( MRLL +MCKK ) < 0
K' =   jHj 1MCD' M( MRLL) > 0
M' =   jHj 1MCD' ( MRLL)MCKK > 0, (9)
where the rst three inequalities follow given that M > 0. For part (v), note that
`' =
@
@'
(L=D) = (1=D)
 
L'  D'`

, so if D' < L

' < 0 then certainly `

' > 0
(since M > 0, ` > [1 +K=D]  b`& 1). Some rearranging shows that indeed
D' = L

' + jHj 1

MCD' ( MRLL)MCKK + MMCD' ( MRLL)
	
< L' < 0. (10)
Armed with this result, we can address how the quality of its deposit base a¤ects
a banks response to increased funding uncertainty at the margin.
Proposition 4 Assume that  > 0, M > 0, M > 0 and MM  0, as well
as MCKK , MR
L
L, and MC
D
D constant. In response to higher funding uncertainty, a
bank with less favourable deposit access reduces lending by more, @
@'
L < 0.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that L = jHj 1 MCDDMCKK <
0 since  > 0. Inserting the expression for the determinant jHj and rearranging
gives
L =   
[ MRLL]
1
1 + M

1
MCKK
+
1
[ MRLL]
+
1
MCDD
 < 0. (11)
By Proposition 3(iv), M' > 0. Note that a higher M
 raises  (since M > 0)
and lowers M (weakly, since MM  0). Together with the assumption that MCKK ,
MRLL, and MC
D
D are constant, it follows that
@
@'
L < 0 as claimed.
By Proposition 3, a bank with worse deposit access is more highly extended
and has more interbank market exposure. Proposition 4, in turn, gives su¢ cient
conditions under which such a bank cuts lending more strongly in response to a rise
in funding uncertainty. In this sense, we nd that a bank with better deposit access
has a competitive advantage in credit markets.
The linearity assumptions on loan demand, as well as the supply of deposits and
capital are thereby made for simplicity and only grossly su¢ cient for the result.
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Loosely put, they mean that a banks marginal incentive to reoptimize (L;D;K) is
una¤ected by their levels, and thus directly comparable across banks with di¤erent
levels of access to deposits.
More important are the assumptions on the funding rate  > 0, M > 0,
M > 0 and MM  0. The rst two of these seem rather weak, and, in any
case, are needed to derive the rst-order result that L < 0. The key economic
assumption is on the cross-partial M > 0 which means that the funding rate is
supermodular in (M;). The funding rate increases in uncertainty, and this e¤ect
is more pronounced at greater levels of interbank market exposure. As long as this
banks decision is not otherwise too di¤erent from another bank with a lower cost of
capital, this it will thus cut back lending relatively more strongly. These conditions
are satised for our two leading examples, for which (R;M; ) = R+ h()M , and
so  = hM > 0, M = h() > 0, M = h > 0, and MM = 0.
These ndings explain recent empirical results on bank behaviour during the
nancial crisis. From a cross-sectional perspective, suppose that banks are identical
except for having di¤erent costs of raising deposits, as indexed by '. Proposition
3 implies that cov(M; `) > 0. Proposition 4 then shows that under reasonable
conditions, cov(L; `) < 0 and cov(L;M) < 0. The same conclusion also holds
in relative terms since by Proposition 3(i) the banks that cut lending more strongly
are also those with a smaller loan book to begin with, i.e., cov(L=L; `) < 0.
These predictions match the picture presented by Figure 1 above, where banking
systems with higher loan-to-deposit ratios experienced sharper reductions in lending,
as well as recent more rigorous empirical evidence. Using data on syndicated loans,
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document that US banks sharply decreased lending,
especially around the height of the crisis in the 4th quarter of 2008. But, importantly,
they also nd that banks that had higher better access to deposit nance cut their
lending by less than other banks. Similarly, in the European context, Iyer et al.
(2013) use Portugese bank loan data to show that banks which relied more heavily
on interbank borrowing before the crisis, were those that cut their credit supply to
rms more strongly during the crisis. As far as we know, our Proposition 4 is the
rst result in the literature that speaks directly to these empirical ndings.
3.5 The role of the cost of capital
We now turn to impact of a banks cost of capital on its response to funding uncer-
tainty. Similar to before, suppose there exists a parameter  which shifts the banks
cost of capital upwards. In particular, suppose that the cost of capital is fK(K; )K,
so the marginal cost is MCK(K; ), and that MCK > 0 everywhere.
Proposition 5 With M > 0, a bank with a higher cost of capital will:
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(i) extend fewer loans L and increase interest rates on loans rL
(ii) take more deposits D and increase interest rates on deposits rD
(iii) reduce its level of equity capital K
(iv) increase its interbank market borrowing M
(v) decrease its loan-to-deposit ratio `
Proof. Performing comparative statics using the same techniques as above, we nd
L = jHj 1 MMCK MCDD < 0
D = jHj 1 MMCK MRLL > 0
K =   jHj 1MCK

M
 
MRLL  MCDD

+MRLLMC
D
D

< 0
M = jHj 1MCK MRLLMCDD > 0, (12)
where the inequalities follow given that M > 0.
With convex borrowing costs M > 0, a higher cost of capital thus induces less
reliance on equity capital and cutbacks in lending; the bank shrinks the size of
its balance sheet and substitutes toward alternative sources of nancing in form of
deposit and interbank markets.23 From a cross-sectional perspective, Proposition 5 is
consistent with evidence from Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) that low-capital
banks tend to charge higher interest rates on loans to their borrowers (especially
when these are small rms) than well-capitalized banks.
Proposition 6 Assume that  > 0, M > 0, M > 0 and MM  0, as well
as MCKK , MR
L
L, and MC
D
D constant. In response to higher funding uncertainty, a
bank with a higher cost of capital reduces lending by more, @
@
L < 0.
Proof. The argument from the proof of Proposition 4 applies.
Taken together, the results from this section are consistent with Cornett et al.
(2011) who nd evidence that banks which relied more heavily on deposit and equity
capital nancing maintained relatively higher lending volumes during the crisis.
3.6 Loss leadersand consumer welfare
In the baseline model, the bank is a monopolist in the market for loans and a
monopsonist in deposits. With  = 0, therefore, the equilibrium features too few
loans and too few deposits, with monopoly prots in both markets.
23The condition M > 0 is needed only for parts (i), (ii), and (v) of the result; if M = 0, the
higher cost of capital would only lead to less equity and more interbank market borrowing, without
having a knock-on e¤ect for loan and deposit markets. But if M > 0, then the induced increase
in M increases the opportunity cost of loans and the implicit return to deposits, thus giving the
other parts of the result. (Note also that Proposition 5 does not require  > 0.)
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Using Example 2, based on limited risk tolerance, we now argue that funding
uncertainty has surprisingly strong implications for the relative level of bank prots
and consumer welfare across di¤erent credit markets. By Proposition 1, a bank
reacts asymmetrically to an increase in funding uncertainty it cuts lending but
expands its deposit base.
The idea is straightforward: Suppose that the market for loans is very attractive
relative to the market for deposits (e.g., borrowers have a high willingness-to-pay in
a boom). If funding uncertainty is low, the bank will wish to have a high loan-to-
deposit ratio and to borrow heavily in the interbank market. As funding uncertainty
increases, the bank reduces its loan-to-deposit ratio, with zero interbank exposure
L = D + K in the limit as  ! 1. The point is that the level of deposits that
satises this zero-exposure constraint may well be much higher than that associated
with low levels of funding uncertainty.
This possibility is most easily illustrated by assuming a xed level of equity
capital K, together with linear loan demand and deposit supply functions, fL(L) =
L   L and fD(D) = D + D.24 Letting  L  (L   R) and  D  (R   D),
where L > R > D, note that the rst-best, competitive outcome in which both
loans and deposits are priced at the banks expected (risk-free) marginal cost of
funding, involves Lfb =  L (for which rL = R) and D
fb =  D (for which rD = R).
By contrast, the two rst-order conditions for a risk-averse bank can be written as
( L   2L)  (1=) (L  D  K) = 0 and ( D   2D)+(1=) (L  D  K) =
0. These can be solved, in the limit as  !1, for
L = 1
2

1
2
( L +  D) +K

and D = 1
2

1
2
( L +  D) K

> 0. (13)
So, if the market for loans is very attractive (in that  L is high), this increases
equilibrium loans, but also increases equilibrium deposits due to risk-based loan-
deposit synergies: Higher lending exposes the bank to greater funding risk, which
induces it to increase deposits to mitigate that risk. For su¢ ciently large  L, it is
therefore possible that rD > R, D > Dfb, so deposits become a loss leaderfor
the bank in that the deposit rate exceeds it own wholesale funding cost. Conversely,
equilibrium depositor welfare exceeds that of a competitive market.
Proposition 7 In the presence of funding uncertainty, it is possible for a banks
deposit business to be loss-making (in expectation).
This result shows that risk-based synergies between the two sides of a banks
balance sheet can lead to cross-subsidization even where a banks loan and deposit
24We assume K < 12 ( L +  D) for an interior solution.
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businesses are entirely independent in terms of demand and supply conditions as
well as operating costs.25,26
While it seems clear that competition for bank deposits has intensied since the
beginning of the nancial crisis, it can be di¢ cult to tell in practice at what point
deposits actually turn into a loss leader. Nonetheless, some recent developments
are striking: In the UK, banks are seeking to attract retail inows by increasing
deposit rates: retail bonds now pay around 200 basis points above the risk-free
rate, compared to a sub-zero spread in 2005 (Bank of England, 2009, p. 38).
Similarly, in the Eurozone, the di¤erence between deposit rates and money market
rates sometimes turned slightly positive between late 2008 until 2011 (ECB, 2012).
The broader point here is that heightened funding uncertainty and loan-deposit
synergies can have surprisingly strong implications for consumer welfare.
4 Monetary policy
In this section, we use our model to explore the implications of increased funding un-
certainty for monetary policy, along three dimensions.27 First, we show that funding
uncertainty tends to weaken the rate of pass-through from changes in the central
banks policy rate to credit markets. Second, we consider the optimal monetary
policy response to an increase in funding uncertainty. This allows us to establish
that the zero lower bound can become binding as a result of increased uncertainty,
justifying the use of unconventional policies such as quantitative easing. Moreover,
we show how policy is a¤ected when there is a liquidity channel.
We initially analyze the policies of a central bank which can determine the policy
rateR. While it can change the e¤ect of increased funding uncertainty  by changing
R, it cannot inuence funding uncertainty directly. This assumption reects a reality
in money markets: While central banks can react to changes in funding conditions,
they cannot move quickly enough to eliminate uncertainty altogether, nor remove
cross-sectional variation in spreads across banks. Our analysis of unconventional
25Note that the bank would not wish to shut down (or sell) its loss-making business as this
would expose it to innite funding uncertainty from a stand-alone operation based only on the
other business.
26Similar arguments can also be applied to show that loans may become a loss leader for the
bank (with positive prots from the deposits business), so rL < R, in which case borrower welfare
exceeds that of a competitive market. It is, of course, not possible for both sides of the bank to
be loss-making at the same time. So either rL > r

D > R (deposits are loss-making, but loans are
highly protable) or R > rL > r

D (loans are loss-making, but deposit funds are very cheap), while
there is always a positive intermediation margin, (rL   rD) > 0, in equilibrium.
27Of course, monetary policy should consider the entire nancial sector, whereas our baseline
model only features a single bank. In this section, we thus think of this bank as being represen-
tative for a larger banking system. The interaction between the mechanisms we study here and
heterogeneity in the banking system remains an important topic for future research.
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tools later on partially relaxes this assumption by considering a central bank which
can directly inject liquidity into money markets.
4.1 Interest rate pass-through
Central banks around the world responded to the recent turmoil in nancial mar-
kets by aggressively cutting interest rates to encourage bank lending and stimulate
demand more generally. However, many policymakers and commentators expressed
surprise at the apparently small impact that this loosening of monetary policy had
on interest rates, especially across credit markets. For example, the minutes of the
Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) noted that some members were con-
cerned that the e¤ectiveness of cuts in the target federal funds rate may have been
diminished by the nancial dislocations, suggesting that further policy action might
have limited e¢ cacy in promoting a recovery in economic growth(FOMC Minutes
of the Meeting of 2829 October 2008).
Let   drL=dR denote interest rate pass-through, i.e., the response of the lending
rate rL to a change in the policy rate R. Pass through can also be written as  =
d
dR
fL(L) = fLL (L
) (@L=@R). Repeating our analysis from Section 3 to determine
@L=@R, we nd that pass-through  = fLL
jHj 1 RMCDDMCKK	 and so:
 =
( fLL )
[ MRLL]
 R
[1 + M(1=MC
K
K + 1=MC
D
D   1=MRLL)]
. (14)
We are interested in the e¤ect of funding uncertainty  on interest pass-through
. Determining this generally is cumbersome because it involves the second-order
comparative static @2L=@R@. Below, we provide general conditions on the sign
and magnitude of this e¤ect.
To guide intuition, we rst discuss the e¤ect under simplifying assumptions. In
particular, assume that the demand and supply functions fL, fD, and fK are linear,
so fLL ,MR
L
L,MC
D
D , andMC
K
K are constants. Furthermore, suppose that the banks
marginal funding cost is as in Examples 1 and 2, with (M;R; ) = R + h()M .
Under these conditions, R = 1, so the only term in  that depends on  is M ,
which is increasing in  given our supermodularity condition M > 0. It follows
by inspection that @=@ < 0, implying that pass-through of policy rate changes to
bank lending rates is indeed weakened by funding uncertainty.
The simplifying assumptions switched o¤the indirect e¤ect of the banks bal-
ance sheet adjustments. In general, we need to place bounds on these indirect
e¤ects in order to characterize the impact of  on (). For this purpose, dene
the curvatures of loan demand L(L)   LfLLL=fLLL and deposit and capital supply
D(D)  DfDDD=fDD and K(K)  KfKKK=fKK . We obtain the following set of results:
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Proposition 8 Suppose there exists a level of funding uncertainty   1 such that
lim! M =1, and that R > 0 is bounded above.
(a) Interest rate pass-through tends to zero as  ! :
lim
!
 = 0.
(b) For any 0 < , there exists a 00 2 (0; ) such that pass-through becomes weaker
when funding uncertainty increases from 0 to 00:
j=0 < j=00 .
(c) Suppose that the expected marginal funding cost is of the form  (M;R; ) =
	 (R; ) + h ()M , where 	 and h are strictly positive functions satisfying 	R > 0,
	  0, 	R  0 and h > 0. If the curvature of loan demand satises L(L)  0
and LL(L) = 0, and the curvatures of deposit and capital supply satisfy 
D(D)  0,
K(K)  0 and DD(D)  0, KK(K)  0, then pass-through decreases in funding
uncertainty:
@
@
< 0.
Proof. (a) The numerator of  is bounded above by assumption, and the denomi-
nator becomes innite as  ! . Hence, ! 0 as required.
(b) Fix any 0 < , and note that j=0 > 0. The result is a corollary of part (a).
(c) The direct e¤ect of an increase in  is strictly negative since R  0 and M > 0
by assumption. So it is su¢ cient to show that the indirect e¤ect (through the choice
variables L, D, K andM) is (weakly) negative. The rst factor in  can be writ-
ten as ( fLL )=[ MRLL] = 1=

2  L(L), which is constant given the assumption
LL(L) = 0. The second factor in  does not depend on M
 since MM = RM = 0.
So if we show that it is increasing in L and decreasing in D,K, the result fol-
lows (since L < 0, D

 > 0, K

 > 0 by Proposition 1). In particular, we need
to show that MRLL, MC
D
D and MC
K
K are all non-increasing functions. First, write
MRLL = f
L
L

2  L(L) where L is constant by assumption and L  0, fLLL  0,
so it follows that MRLLL  0. Second, write MCDD = fDD

2 + D(D)

where
D  0 , fDDD  0, so MCDDD = fDDD(2 + D) + fDD DD  0 since DD  0 by
assumption and (2 + D) > 0 by the banks second-order condition. Third, the
argument for MCKKK  0 is identical.
Although not completely general, Proposition 8 suggests that interest rate pass-
through will typically be dampened when uncertainty on funding conditions is high.
Put di¤erently, bankspricing of loans becomes more rigid and less responsive to
shocks.In this sense, monetary policy becomes less e¤ective at inuencing a banks
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decision-making process with market interest rates on loans typically completely
frozen in the limiting case where funding uncertainty becomes large.
It is worth discussing some of the technical conditions in part (c) that guarantee
@=@ < 0 in more detail. First, a key condition is again that M > 0, so the banks
expected funding rate is supermodular in the amount borrowed M and funding
uncertainty . Second, funding costs in our Examples 1 and 2 satisfy 	(R; ) = R,
so that the cross-partial R = 	R = 0. (The rate of pass-through is even lower if
the initial pass-through from the central banks policy rate to an individual banks
funding rate is itself also reduced by funding uncertainty, i.e., if 	R  0.) Third,
the assumptions on the curvature of demand and supply functions are restrictive.
As for loan demand, the requirement of constant curvature (LL = 0) corresponds to
a functional form fL(L) = L   LLL , and L  0 corresponds to L  1, that is,
a weakly concave demand curve. All these conditions are satised for Examples 1
and 2 as long as demand and supply curves are not too non-linear.
To sum up, Proposition 8 may help provide an explanation for the reduced impact
that interest rate cuts by central banks in the 20079 nancial crisis are often said
to have had.28 Clearly, it would be interesting and useful for any future econometric
research on pass-through to empirically test this prediction more formally.29
4.2 Optimal monetary policy response
A natural conclusion from our analysis is that a central bank seeking to stabilize
macroeconomic variables would wish to respond to increased funding uncertainty; it
has signicant e¤ects on bank lending to the real economy which can, in turn, a¤ect
output and ination, the typical target variables of monetary policy.
A full model of the interactions between bank lending, output and ination is
beyond the scope of this paper; instead, we consider a simplied model where the
objective of the central bank is to achieve a certain target level of bank lending, de-
noted bL. Our approach can be thought of as a reduced-form version of the textbook
macroeconomic model in which the central bank faces an output-ination trade-o¤
(a short-run Phillips curve), and picks the optimal point along the curve by mini-
mizing a loss function. Hence, optimal monetary implies target levels of output and
28It also suggests that any empirical evidence for banks adjusting interest rates by less than they
otherwise would have may reect a rational response to heightened funding uncertainty rather
than being indicative of collusive behaviour, for example.
29There is some econometric evidence for reduced pass-through during the recent crisis. Aristei
and Gallo (2012) use a regime-switching model to show that pass-through dropped signicantly
in periods of nancial distress in the Euro area. Harbo Hansen and Welz (2011) show decreased
pass-through from monetary policy to retail rates in Sweden after 2007, especially for retail loans
with long maturities. While these studies are consistent with our results, to our knowledge, no
empirical study has directly explored the link between pass-through and funding uncertainty. See
Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) for previous evidence on pass-through in the Eurozone, with an emphasis
on the role of competition.
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ination at any point in time. If we assume that monetary policy mainly a¤ects
output through the bank lending channel, and that output is a strictly increasing
function of bank lending, then optimal policy is well-approximated by the bank
lending target we stipulate.
We have a simple characterization of optimal policy:
Proposition 9 Suppose that  > 0, R > 0, and that the central bank is achieving
its policy objective, L = bL. Then the optimal monetary policy response to a marginal
increase in funding uncertainty satises
dR
d
=   (M
; R; )
R (M
; R; )
< 0.
Proof. Suppose funding uncertainty increases by d. It is easy to show that to
keep lending constant, the central bank must ensure that all of the banks choices,
including M, remain constant. Hence, from the rst-order conditions, the optimal
change in the interest rate dR must satises  (M; R; ) =  (M; R + dR;  + d).
For small changes,  (M; R; )   (M; R + dR;  + d) = d + RdR. Setting
this to zero yields the required expression.
Not surprisingly, interest rates should be cut in response to increased funding
uncertainty to stimulate lending. Moreover, there is a simple rule for the desired
interest rate reduction: It is proportional to the ratio of the impact of uncertainty
on marginal funding costs (d) to the impact of policy rate changes on funding
costs (R). This analysis is illustrated in Figure 2. The banks iso-lending curves
are plotted in policy-rate/funding-uncertainty space. Lending is high in the south-
west of the gure, where interest rates and uncertainty are low. The solid curve
is the iso-lending curve corresponding to the central banks target lending level bL.
Its (negative) slope is equal to the optimal interest rate increase required to hold
lending constant when  increases, dR=d.
In our two examples, this slope dR=d becomes steeper as  increases, so iso-
lending curves are concave. As a result, the optimal interest rate cut is increasing in
current funding uncertainty, e.g., higher at point B than at point A. More generally,
moving beyond Examples 1 and 2, iso-lending curves will be concave as long as low
interest rates and low uncertainty are complements in stimulating bank lending, so
that banks prefer averages to extremes, e.g., moderate interest rates and mid-
range funding uncertainty stimulate more lending than low R and high .
4.3 The zero lower bound and unconventional policy
We have established that when funding uncertainty increases, the central bank opti-
mally cuts interest rates to achieve its target level of bank lending. We now consider
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Figure 2: Iso-lending curves in policy-rate/funding-uncertainty space
the possibility that such a cut is not possible due to a zero lower boundon policy
rates. As R is dened as a gross interest rate, the constraint is R  1  0.
Denition The zero lower bound on the policy rate is binding if LjR=1 < bL.
Our analysis above implies that even if the central bank is currently achieving its
lending target, the zero lower bound can become binding when funding uncertainty
increases. This happens precisely when the rate cut prescribed by the logic of
Proposition 9 is larger than the current net interest rate R  1:
Lemma 1 Suppose that  = 0, and the central bank achieves its lending target
with policy rate R0 > 1, i.e., LjR=R0 = bL. If  > 0, R > 0 and R0 is su¢ ciently
close to 1, there exists a 1 > 0 such that the zero lower bound becomes binding
when funding uncertainty increases from 0 to 1.
Proof. Let R1 denote the unconstrained optimal policy rate under 1, and write
R0 = (1 + ) for some  > 0. Using Proposition 9, and integrating, we obtain
R1 = R0  
Z 1
0


R

d. (15)
Since the integral is strictly positive, we have that R1 < 1 for small enough , which
implies a binding zero lower bound as required.
We now turn to Example 1 to show how unconventional policies such as large-
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scale asset purchases and quantitative easing may allow the central bank to alle-
viate the zero lower bound problem, at least to some extent. One could argue that
such policies allow the central bank to control liquidity in the interbank market in-
dependently of its policy rate. By doing so, they can stimulate bank lending without
further interest rate cuts. Recall that in Example 1, expected aggregate liquidity 
played a key role in marginal funding costs. To model the e¤ect of unconventional
policy, suppose that there is a parameter   0 which is controlled directly by the
central bank through unconventional policies, and that aggregate liquidity satises
 = 0 + . (16)
It follows that unconventional policy may become useful after an increase in funding
uncertainty:
Proposition 10 In Example 1, suppose that funding uncertainty increases from 0
to 1 as in Lemma 1, and that  = 0 before the increase. Then there exists a unique
optimal liquidity injection b > 0 such that the central bank achieves its lending target
after the increase by setting R = 1 and  = b.
Proof. The central bank would like to keep money market borrowing constant at
its initial level M. Making the dependence of funding costs on liquidity explicit by
writing  (R;M; ;), an optimal injection  = b must satisfy
 (1;M; 1;0 + ) = (R0;M; 0;0) (17)
Since the zero lower bound binds after the increase, the left-hand side is greater than
the right-hand side for  = 0. Moreover, as  ! 1, the left-hand side converges
to 1, whereas the right-hand side is bounded below by R0 > 1. Hence, there is a
unique b satisfying the equation.
Because liquidity matters for the real e¤ects of funding uncertainty, unconven-
tional monetary policies which raise liquidity can have an impact that is similar to
interest rate cuts. This is because both interest rate cuts and liquidity injections
lower the expected marginal cost of funding. Unconventional policies can substitute
for interest rate cuts when these are no longer feasible.
Of course, we have simplied things here by assuming that there is no further
cost associated with liquidity injections, such as additional inationary pressures or
the danger of creating asset price bubbles. Modelling the impact of unconventional
policies in a full framework that takes these costs into account is beyond our scope
but may o¤er a fruitful area for further research.
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4.4 The liquidity channel of monetary policy
So far we have assumed that the central bank chooses R without having any further
impact on money markets. This is perhaps unrealistic. In practice, monetary policy
is conducted through operations a¤ect liquidity in money markets. In the UK and
the Eurozone, the central bank lends to commercial banks at the policy rate. A
higher policy rate implies less demand for loans from the central bank, which reduces
market liquidity. In the US, the Fed uses bond sales and purchases to inuence the
interest rate in the federal reserve market. When the policy rate is lowered, the
Fed sells government bonds. This decreases the aggregate supply of reserves, again
implying less liquidity.
Formally, consider Example 1 with the extension that average liquidity is given
by  = (R), where 0(R) < 0.30 How does this a¤ect our earlier results? We now
have that funding costs satisfy
(M;R; ) = R +
(R)
(R)2   2M
 =) R = 1  0(R)
(R)2 + 2
[(R)2   2]2M
 > 1.
Since R is a key factor in the optimal policy response (see Proposition 9), the last
equation implies that the response has to be adjusted when monetary policy has
liquidity e¤ects.
To analyze this formally, we compare two scenarios. In the rst scenario, liquidity
is policy-sensitive (0(R) < 0), and the central bank has set the interest rate to
R = R0 and thereby managed to achieve its lending target L = bL. In the second
scenario, liquidity  is held constant at the level arising from optimal policy in
the rst scenario, i.e.  = (R0). When there is a marginal increase in funding
uncertainty , we know that the required policy response is dR =   (=R) d.
Since  is the same in both scenarios, and we have shown that R is greater when
0 (R) < 0, it follows that:
Proposition 11 In Example 1, the optimal policy monetary response to a marginal
increase in funding uncertainty is smaller when in the presence of a liquidity channel
(0(R) < 0) than when  is constant.
Intuitively, the impact of monetary policy on funding costs is strengthened
through the liquidity channel, and this reduces the interest rate cut required to
achieve the policy target.
Furthermore, note that R now depends positively on current money market
exposureM. Ceteris paribus, an increase inM has a smaller e¤ect on the optimal
30Since we are interested in the liquidity channel of interest rate policy, we ignore unconventional
policy without loss of generality. In order to obtain sensible results, we continue to assume that
 < (R) for all R.
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policy when liquidity is policy-sensitive. This reduced sensitivity to banksmoney
market exposure is due to two opposing e¤ects in the presence of the liquidity
channel. On one hand, banks that are heavily exposed to money markets respond
more to increased funding uncertainty, suggesting, as before, that policy should
respond more strongly. On the other hand, heavily exposed banks also respond
more to the changes in liquidity that a policy change creates. The second e¤ect
implies that policy is more e¤ective with heavily exposed banks and has to adjust
less strongly.
5 Conclusion
Uncertainty over funding conditions in money markets has important consequences
for bank behaviour. Focusing on banking systems with loan-to-deposit ratios above
100%, we have studied a setup with convex wholesale borrowing costs which arise,
e.g., due to counterparty risk and limited aggregate liquidity or nite risk tolerance
of a banks managers. By contrast, a large existing literature using related banking
models pays scant attention to funding uncertainty and thus has little to say about
one of the key characteristics of the recent nancial crisis.
We have shown that two key conditions are needed to explain a diverse set of
stylized facts on bank behaviour during the crisis: (i) funding uncertainty raises a
banks (risk-adjusted) expected wholesale funding cost at the margin ( > 0), and
(ii) its wholesale funding rate is supermodular in the funding uncertainty and the
amount borrowed (M > 0).
Increased funding uncertainty then leads to contractions in bankslending vol-
umes, balance sheets, and protability; by contrast, savers benet from increased
competition in deposit markets with the possibility of deposits turning into a loss
leader. Our results can explain how banks with a stronger deposit base have done
better since the crisis, and why other banks such as RBS set themselves the goal of
reducing their loan-to-deposit ratios back towards 100%.
Our results on monetary policy show that increased funding uncertainty typically
dampens the rate of interest pass-through from the central banks policy rates to
market interest rates. We have derived some guidance for monetary policy following
such an increase: Interest rates should be cut according to the banking systems ex-
posure to money markets, and according to current levels of uncertainty. Moreover,
reduced pass-through opens up the possibility that funding uncertainty leads to a
binding zero lower bound on policy rates, and yields a rationale for unconventional
policies such as quantitative easing and other liquidity-enhancing measures.
Of course, thinking about bank behaviour and its implications for the econ-
omy is a complex task, especially in the context of a nancial crisis, and we have
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abstracted from some important issues. For example, we have not incorporated
general-equilibrium e¤ects across credit markets, and, relatedly, not attempted a
full-edged welfare analysis. Future work might also examine the role of hetero-
geneity in the banking sector, notably in terms of implications for monetary policy.
More research into why funding conditions became so volatile in the rst place is
clearly also still needed.
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Appendix: Robustness analysis
Extension A: Equity capital requirement
Our benchmark model allows the bank to optimally adjust its level of equity accord-
ing to market conditions, including the degree of funding uncertainty. An alternative
assumption would be that the banks capital is (exogenously) xed, perhaps due a
binding regulatory capital constraint or because the bank is unable to raise addi-
tional equity from investors in the short run.
With xed equity capital, the banks program boils down to two rst-order con-
ditions for loans and deposits. Just as a above, higher funding uncertainty reduces
the attractiveness of wholesale borrowing because  > 0. This induces the bank to
substitute away to other funding sources, in this case (only) customer deposits, and
to cut back on its loan commitments. As a result, its money market exposure and
loan-to-deposit ratio decline, all just as in Proposition 1. Similar reasoning shows
that its expected prots decline, as in Proposition 2.
Proposition 1A/2A Suppose a banks equity capital is held xed. Parts (i), (ii),
(iv) and (v) of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 apply.
Proof. The banks rst-order conditions are reduced to
UL = MR
L    = 0
UD =  MCD +  = 0 (18)
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Totally di¤erentiating yields the following system of equations: 
ULL ULD
UDL UDD
!

 
L
D
!
=  
 
UL
UD
!
(19)
The left-hand matrix is the Hessian of the objective function U , as dened in Section
2, which we call H, and it satises jHj > 0. Cramers rule yields
L =   jHj 1 MCDD < 0
D =   jHj 1 MRLL > 0 (20)
which proves part (i) of Proposition 1. Parts (ii), (iv), and (v) follow as in the proof
of Proposition 1. By the envelope theorem, the banks expected equilibrium payo¤
changes by
@
@
U(L; D) =   @
@
E[C(M; R; ")]
=  RM
0
(M
0; R; )dM 0 < 0, (21)
thus conrming Proposition 2.
Extension B: Exposure to multiple risks
To focus sharply on funding uncertainty, the benchmark model assumes that this is
the only risk the bank faces. In practice, of course, a bank faces credit risks in its
loan portfolio and other uncertainties. Modeling these can make the analysis much
more complicated; nonetheless, under fairly mild conditions, we can show that the
key insights are preserved in settings with multiple risks.
Begin by observing that, due to the additive separability of the banks objective
function, additional risks in loan, deposit and capital markets have no e¤ect on our
results as long as they are not correlated with risk in the money market. We could
simply re-dene the revenue and cost functions from above as the expectation of
revenue and cost in the respective market, and the analysis remains unchanged.
More interesting cases arise when risks in other markets are correlated with the
money market. To explore this, without further loss of generality, we allow the
marginal revenue and marginal cost functions to depend on our money market risk
parameter . We here focus on additional sources of uncertainty in the loans market
and in the market for equity investment.
Let fL (L; ) and fK (K; ) denote the inverse demand and supply functions for
loans and capital, and let MRL (L; ) = @f
L(L;)L
@L
and MCK (K; ) = @f
K(K;)K
@K
.
Loans market risk. Suppose rst that higher wholesale funding uncertainty also
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hurts the banks loans business in that it reduces (expected) marginal revenue,
MRL < 0. This could be because factors, such as heightened perceptions of coun-
terparty risk, that raise wholesale funding uncertainty also raise the credit risks
associated with commercial bankscustomer lending. It is intuitive that this ad-
ditional credit risk will induce the bank to (further) cut lending, such that our
conclusion that L < 0 from Proposition 1 certainly obtains.
Things are somewhat more complex for the impact on deposits and equity cap-
ital. The reason is that the credit-risk-induced decline in lending, all else equal,
reduces the banks needs for nancing from these sources; in other words, there is
a countervailing e¤ect to the ndings from Proposition 1 that D > 0 and K

 > 0.
We show that these results continue to hold when the impact of funding uncertainty
on the loans business (MR:L ) is small relative to its impact on the money market
().
Proposition 1B/2B (loan market risks) Suppose that funding uncertainty is
correlated with risks in the loans market, with MRL < 0. Part (i) of Proposition 1
as well as Proposition 2 apply; parts (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) of Proposition 1 apply
whenever =
MRL  > M= MRLL.
Proof. The system of equations we need to solve is the same as in the proof of
Proposition 1. The only change is that now, UL =MRL   . Solving, we obtain
L = jHj 1

MC
D
DMC
K
K  MRL

M(MC
D
D +MC
K
K ) +MC
D
DMC
K
K
	
< 0
D =   jHj 1MCKK

MMR
L
   MRLL

K =   jHj 1MCDD

MMR
L
   MRLL

, (22)
where D; K

 > 0 if and only if =
MRL  > M= MRLL. The remaining compar-
ative statics follow as before. By the envelope theorem,
@
@
U(L; D; K) =
@
@

fL(L; )L   E[C(M; R; ")]	
=
R L
0
MRL (L
0; ) dL0   RM
0
(M
0; R; )dM 0 < 0. (23)
Equity capital risk. Suppose instead that higher funding risk also leads to a
tightening in the market for equity capital such that MCK > 0. Loosely put, this
means that the incremental cost of raising an additional dollar of capital also rises,
thus making equity less attractive. It is intuitive, based on our earlier discussion,
that such a rise in the cost of capital makes lending less attractive, and conversely,
means that the bank considers customer deposits relatively more favourable as an
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alternative nancing source. So our earlier ndings from Proposition 1 that L < 0
and D > 0 continue to hold, with corresponding increases in loan and deposit rates.
Also intuitively, the result that the bank responds by raising more capital becomes
less clear-cut due to the cost-of-capital e¤ect. We will show that it continues to hold
when the impact of  on the capital market (MCK ) is small relative to its impact
on the money market ().
Proposition 1B/2B (equity capital risk) Suppose that funding risks are cor-
related with risks in the capital market, with MCK > 0. Parts (i), (ii) and (v) of
Proposition 1 as well as Proposition 2 apply; parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1
apply if and only if

MCK
> 1 + M

1
MCDD
+
1
jMRLLj

.
Proof. The system of equations we need to solve is the same as in the proof of
Proposition 1. The only change is that now, UK =  MCL + . Solving, we
obtain
L = jHj 1

MC
D
DMC
K
K + MMC
K
 MC
D
D
	
> 0
D = jHj 1MRLL

MC
K
K + MMC
K

	
> 0
K =   jHj 1MCDDMRLL
  +MCK M(1=MCDD   1=MRLL) + 1	 ,(24)
where K > 0 holds under the proposed condition. The remaining comparative
statics follow as before. By the envelope theorem,
@
@
U(L; D; K) =
@
@
 fK(K; )K   E[C(M; R; ")]	
=  R K
0
MCK (K
0; ) dK 0   RM
0
(M
0; R; )dM 0 < 0.(25)
Extension C: Competition between banks
The setup underlying the benchmark model is also easily extended to Nash-Cournot
competition between n  2 banks, which might be o¤ering di¤erentiated savings
and loan products.
Suppose that the inverse demand curve for loans from bank j 2 N is given
by rjL = g
L

Lj + L
P
k 6=j L
k

, where gLL() < 0 similar to above and L 2 [0; 1]
is a measure of (symmetric) horizontal product di¤erentiation between the loans
associated with di¤erent banks. Similarly, deposit supply for bank j is given by
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rjD = g
D

Dj + D
P
k 6=j D
k

, where gDD() > 0 and D 2 [0; 1]. This setup e¤ectively
nests all market structures ranging from perfect competition (with L = D = 1 and
n!1) to monopoly (with L = D = 0 or n = 1). As before, bank j also faces an
inverse supply curve for equity rjK = g
K (Kj).
Using its balance sheet constraint, M j = Lj   Dj   Kj, an individual banks
new maximization problem is to maxLj ;Dj ;Kj U j = gL()Lj   gD()Dj   gK()Kj  
E[Cj(Lj   Dj   Kj; R; ")]. We redene the marginal revenue and marginal cost
functions, which are identical across banks, as MRL = @
@Lj

gL()Lj, MCD =
@
@Dj

gD()Dj, MCK = @
@Kj

gK()Kj, and its expected wholesale funding rate
(M j; R; ) = @
@Mj
E[C(M j; R; ")].
The rst-order conditions for bank j are
U jL = MR
L

Lj + L
P
k 6=j L
k

  j(M j; R; ) = 0
U jD =  MCD

Dj + D
P
k 6=j D
k

+ j(M j; R; ) = 0
U jK =  MCK(Kj) + j(M j; R; ) = 0. (26)
We assume that gL(), gD() and gK() are such that the problem is well-behaved
with an interior solution. In symmetric Nash equilibrium with Lj = L, Dj = D,
Kj = K, M j =M we thus have
MRL ([1 + L(n  1)]L)  (M; R; ) = 0
 MCD ([1 + D(n  1)]D) + (M; R; ) = 0
 MCK (K) + (M; R; ) = 0. (27)
These three sector-level equilibrium conditions correspond to those for the monopoly
bank from the benchmark model (which are nested with L = D = 0 or n = 1),
and take a very similar shape to those presented in Section 3. Therefore, as long
as  > 0, the results of Proposition 1 obtain. When funding uncertainty increases,
each individual bank in a sector-wide equilibrium substitutes deposits and capital
for costly money market funding, and reduces the size of its balance sheet (L < 0)
due to the increased overall marginal cost of funds.
A minor complication arises when considering bank protability. As before, an
individual banks protability is reduced when  increases due to the direct cost
of funds e¤ect. However, there are two additional e¤ects arising from competitive
behaviour. Firstly, there is ercer competition for deposits, as competitors substitute
away from money markets. This reduces protability by increasing equilibrium
deposit rates. Secondly, there is less competition for loans as competitors reduce
lending activity. This raises equilibrium lending rates and protability.
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In order to establish Proposition 2, we therefore need to show that the last e¤ect
is dominated by the other two, leading to reduced protability overall. Grossly
su¢ cient is that the competitiveness of the loan market, i.e., the di¤erentiation
parameter L, or the curvature of loan demand 
L =  LgLLL=gLL are su¢ ciently small
compared to their counterparts in the deposit market (D and 
D = DgDDD=g
D
D). A
simple set of su¢ cient conditions is L  D and L  D.
Proposition 1C/2C Suppose there are n  2 banks engaged in Nash-Cournot
competition with di¤erentiated savings and loan products. Proposition 1 applies, and
Proposition 2 certainly applies if
1=D + (n  1)
1=L + (n  1) 
 
2  L 
2 + D
 .
Proof. Dene the following functions:
MRL ([1 + L(n  1)]L)  (L  D  K; R; ) = fWL
 MCD ([1 + D(n  1)]D) + (L  D  K; R; ) = fWD
 MCK (K) + (L  D  K; R; ) = fWK . (28)
We have fWL = fWD = fWK = 0 by the symmetric equilibrium condition. Totally
di¤erentiating this system yields0B@ fWLL fWLD fWLKfWDL fWDD fWDKfWKL fWKD fWKK
1CA
0B@ L


D
K
1CA =  
0B@ fWLfWDfWK
1CA . (29)
Let eH denote the left-hand side matrix, which has a strictly negative determinant
since the demand and supply functions are well-behaved. Furthermore, dene the
adjusted marginal revenue and cost functions
gMRLL = [1 + L (n  1)]MRLLgMCDD = [1 + D (n  1)]MCDD . (30)
Cramers rule yields
L =
 eH 1 gMCDDMCKK < 0
D =
 eH 1 gMRLLMCKK > 0 (31)
K =
 eH 1 gMRLLgMCDD > 0.
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The comparative statics of Proposition 1 follow as before. Turning to Proposition
2, by the envelope theorem and symmetry, we have
@
@
U j(Lj; Dj; Kj;L j; D j)
=   @
@
E[C(M j; R; ")] + Lg
0
L(n  1)L   Dg0D(n  1)D
<  Lg0L(n  1)L   Dg0D(n  1)D
= (n  1)

 
 eH 1 h MCKK gMCDDgMRLLi
(
L
g0LgMRLL   D
g0DgMCDD
)
sign
=
L
1 + L (n  1)
1 
2  L   D1 + D (n  1) 1 2 + D . (32)
The rst inequality follows since @
@
E[C()] > 0 as before, and the second equality
uses the above expressions for L and D

. Hence the proposed condition is su¢ cient
for @
@
U j() < 0.
These arguments make clear that our results are quite robust to changes in
market structure and the degree of product di¤erentiation; they are rather funda-
mentally driven by substitution e¤ects away from wholesale funding. Indeed, this
analysis could easily be generalized further to allow for (i) asymmetries between the
competing banks, for example in terms of operating costs, (ii) for vertical product
di¤erentiation with rjL = g
L
L() + jL, where
jL not too large is a bank-specic
interest-rate di¤erential which allows for heterogeneity in loan pricing across banks,
or (iii) for models where banks set interest rates in Bertrand-Nash competition,
rather than choosing quantities as in our benchmark setup.
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